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The Victorio Campaign of 1880:
Cooperation and Conflict on the
United States-Mexico Border
BRUCE

J.

DINGES

On August 21, 1879, Victorio and a small band of Warm Springs Apaches
bolted from the Mescalero reservation near Fort Stanton, New Mexico.
The following day, Major Albert P. Morrow set out from Fort Bayard
on a grueling pursuit across the United States border into Mexico and
a futile assault upon the Indians' fortified position near the Corralitos
River. Colonel Edward Hatch, commanding the District of New Mexico,
belatedly requested permission for United States troops to cross into
Mexico and urged concerted action between the armed forces of the
two countries. The first of dozens of such requests from American
officials, Hatch's proposal fell on deaf ears in Mexico City. For the next
year, Victorio and his followers spread panic and destruction throughout southern New Mexico, West Texas, and northern Chihuahua. Among
the significant advantages enjoyed by the swift-moving Apaches was
their ability to create confusion by cutting across military and political
borders-in particular, the international boundary separating Mexico
and the United States. Ultimately, the Victorio campaign became a test
Bruce J. Dinges has published extensively on frontier military history. His biography
of Benjamin H. Grierson appears in the anthology Soldiers West: Biographies from the
Military Frontier (1987). He is editor of The Journal of Arizona History.
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Apache leader Victorio. Courtesy Arizona Historical Society.
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of the flexibility of the Army command structure in the Southwest and
a significant episode in United States-Mexican relations.!
The Victorio outbreak erupted during a period of strained relations
along the border dating back almost to the close of the Civil War. When
the Mexican government proved unable-or unwilling-to deal with
Kickapoo raids on Texan cattle and horses, the Grant Administration
in 1873 had adopted an aggressive posture as it surreptitiously authorized Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie to invade Mexican territory and
strike the Kickapoo villages in Coahuila. 2
Mackenzie's stunning military success was not lost on Brigadier
General E. O. C. Ord, who assumed command of the Department of
Texas in April 1875. Ord devoted much attention to the Rio Grande
frontier-so much attention, in fact, that one of his subordinates halfjokingly commented that "Old Ord has got the Mexican border troubles
on the brain."3 When raids by Lipan and Mescalero Apaches from
Mexico into Texas increased in 1875 and 1876, Ord dispatched Lieutenant Colonel William R. Shafter and his resourceful subaltern, Lieutenant John Lapham Bullis, on repeated forays into northern Mexico
at the head of black troopers, infantry, and Seminole-Negro scouts.
Preoccupied with the political upheaval that elevated Porfirio Dfaz to
the presidency in late 1876, the Mexican government was impotent
either to halt Indian incursions from its territory into the United States
or object strongly to American violations of its territorial sovereignty. 4
With the inauguration of Rutherford B. Hayes as president in March
of 1877, a protracted diplomatic chess game commenced, with the new
chief executive holding out the carrot of recognition to the Dfaz government in return for a remedy to longstanding American grievances,
1. The standard biography of the Apache leader is Dan L. Thrapp, Victoria alld the
Mimbres Apaches (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974). For military operations
during the Victorio campaign, see William H. Leckie, The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of
the Negro Cavalry ill the West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 210-29.
2. A survey of the military aspects of the Mexican border conflict, 1870-1881, is in
Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army alld the Indian, 1866-1891 (New
York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1973), 353-77. For Mackenzie's incursion into
Mexico, see R. G. Carter, 011 the Border with Mackellzie (New York: Antiquarian Press,
1961), 416-72; and Ernest Wallace, Rallald 5. Mackellzie all the Texas Frolltier (Lubbock:
West Texas Museum Association, 1964), 92-114.
3. Benjamin H. Grierson to Alice Grierson, July 31, 1877, Box 1, Fort Davis National
Historic Site Papers, Southwest Collection, Texas Tech University, Lubbock.
4. Shafter's activities are described in Paul H. Carlson, "William R. Shafter: Military
Commander in the West" (doctoral dissertation, Texas Tech University, 1973), 182-231.
See also Edward S. Wallace, "General John Lapham Bullis, Thunderbolt of the Texas
Frontier," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 55 (July 1951), 77-85.
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including the chaotic border situation. Diaz, on the other hand, hinted
that Mexico might be willing to negotiate an agreement permitting
border crossings, but only after the United States granted recognition.
No sooner, however, had Dfaz sent a capable commander, General
Geronimo Trevino, to the northern frontier, than Secretary of War
George W. McCrary issued an order of June 1/ 1877/ authorizing Ord/s
troops to cross the Rio Grande when in hot pursuit or on the fresh
trail of marauders. Outraged, the Mexican government two weeks later
instructed Trevino /Ito repel with force the crossing of American troops
into Mexican territory." United States recognition of the Diaz regime
the following April and increased activity of the Mexican military on
the northern frontier eased tensions perceptibly between the two governments/ until the Victorio outbreak dramatically reopened old diplomatic sores. 5
Victorio quickly demonstrated that he was no respecter of nationalities as he terrorized the area around Chihuahua City in Mexico from
his stronghold in the Candelaria Mountains. Following the ambush
and double massacre of civilians from Carrizal, Mariano Sameniego, a
powerful political figure in northern Mexico residing at Paso del Norte,
called for a retaliatory raid by his fellow citizens on the Mescalero
reservation in New Mexico. Louis H. Scott, the American consul at
Chihuahua, reported that the "entire country north of the city" had
been demoralized by the Indian raids. Lieutenant George R. Baylor
and a small party of Texas Rangers and civilian volunteers from Mexico
and the United States appeared to be the only armed force in the field
south of the border. 6
As early as October 1/ the United States Department of State had
instructed its consul at Mexico City, John W. Foster, to press the Mexican government for cooperation between the military forces of the
two countries in pursuit of Victoria's band. Eager to end the destruction
5. John W. Foster to William M. Evarts, January 17, 1878, in Papers Relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1878 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1878), 541. Utley, Frontier Regulars, 360-61. The subject of diplomatic relations between
the United States and the Dfaz government is discussed in Daniel Cosio Villegas, The
United States Versus Profirio Diaz (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963).
6. Louis H. Scott to W. Hunter, November 28, 1879, enclosed in Evarts to Alexander
Ramsey, Dece~ber 16, 1879, Victorio Papers, Special File, Letters Received, Military
Division of the Missouri, RG 393, National Archives. Thrapp, Victoria, 255-56. Baylor'S
report of the Carrizal massacre appeared in the New York Times, January 17, 1880. The
activities of the Texas Rangers during the Victorio campaign are described in James B.
Gillette, Six Years with the Texas Rangers, 1875-1881 (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1925), 161-69, 180-89.
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and bloodshed on Mexican soil, Dfaz appeared receptive to the American proposal. By early December, General Trevino was organizing a
campaign with500 regulars to drive Victorio back across the Rio Grande.
Consul Scott advised "concerted action" on the part of Hatch's troops
in New Mexico, and became a vocal advocate of permission for troops
to cross into Mexico. "This thing of one side chasing them [the Indians]
across the line, and then in a month have the other side chase them
back again," he prophetically observed, "is in my opinion a poor way
to fight them."? In response to a request from the governor of Chihuahua, Brigadier General John Pope, commanding the Department
of the Missouri at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, deployed Major Morrow's. command in southern New Mexico and requested assistance
from Brigadier General Orlando Willcox, his counterpart in Arizona,
to intercept the Apaches should Trevino drive them back across the
border. 8 To the east, General Ord instructed Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson of the Tenth Cavalry, commanding the District of the Pecos in West
Texas, to cooperate with the proposed movement and to relay information on Victorio's whereabouts to the Mexican commander through
Sameniego in Paso del Norte. This awkward and uncertain passage of
intelligence would continue fitfully throughout the coming campaign. 9
Despite the apparent willingness of the Dfaz government to coordinate military movements against Victorio, politics were uppermost
in the mind of the Mexican leader. Consul Foster toured the frontier
states in the winter of 1879-1880 and found unprecedented peace and
order. He cautioned, however, that presidential elections were on the
horizon and that political violence could be expected. General Trevino
had only recently put down a rebellion in the Chihuahua capital, and
Dfaz could be expected to place the suppression of domestic disorder
above Indian troubles. "While we must recognize the good intentions
of the Mexican authorities and give them due credit for the measure
7. Hunter to Foster, October 1, 1879, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States. 1880 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880),708. Scott to
Hunter, November 28, 1879, Victorio Papers.
8. John Pope to W. D. Whipple, January 9, 1880, Victorio Papers.
9. Telegram, Thomas M. Vincent to District Commander, Fort Concho, Texas, December 11, 1879, Letters Received, District of the Pecos, RG 393, National Archives. For
Grierson's frontier military career, see Bruce J. Dinges, "Benjamin H. Grierson," in Paul
Andrew Hutton, ed., Soldiers West: Biographies from the Militan) Frontier (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 157-75. Grierson's family life is portrayed in William
H. Leckie and Shirley A. Leckie, Unlikely Warriors: General Benjamin H. Grierson and His
Family (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984).
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of peace and order now existing," he cautioned, "we can have no
guarantee that such a state of affairs will long continue."lo
On the opposite side of the river, General Ord was impressed
enough with the improvement of conditions on the Mexican frontier
to recommend in his 1879 annual report that the order of June I, 1877,
be rescinded. In light of the Victorio outbreak and political unrest in
Chihuahua, however, the Texas commander called for more troops to
patrol the north bank of the Rio Grande and requested that, for the
time being, the order authorizing border crossing by U.S. troops "not
be modified in any way whatever."lI
Trevino's campaign fizzled, and in early January, 1880, Victorio
crossed back into New Mexico. While Hatch's troopers rode their mounts
into the ground in fruitless pursuit of the Apaches, Hatch's superior,
General Pope, lashed out against the Department of the Interior for
turning reservations into safe havens for hostile Apaches, and announced his intention to disarm and dismount the remaining Indians
on the Mescalero reservation to prevent them from joining Victorio. 12
The attempt to corner Victorio in the Black Mountains of southwestern New Mexico demonstrated that coordination of troop movements could be as difficult across military jurisdictions as across
international boundaries. Hatch's plan called for Captain Curwen B.
McLellan, with troopers of the Sixth Cavalry and Lieutenant Charles
B. Gatewood's Apache scouts from the Department of Arizona, to
cooperate as Hatch moved north with Morrow's command toward the
Mescalero reservation, striking Victorio along the way. Meanwhile,
Colonel Grierson and 280 troopers of the Tenth Cavalry marched north
and west from the Department of Texas to cut off escape in that direction and assist in disarming the Mescaleros. Unfortunately for Hatcn,
Victorio sprung the trap on April 7, when he surprised and severely
mauled Captain Henry Carroll's command in Membrillo Canyon. Hatch
and Grierson converged on the Mescalero reservation on the appointed
day, April 12, but botched the operation. Fourteen warriors were killed
in the ensuing melee and at least two dozen escaped.
Their tasks completed, McLellan and Grierson returned in early
May to their respective departments, leaving Hatch to continue his
backbreaking pursuit of Victorio through the arid and mountainous
10. Foster to Evarts, December 27, 1879, Foreign Relations, 1880, 726-27.
11. E. O. C. Ord to Adjutant General, Military Division of the Missouri, November
28, 1879, Letters Sent, Department of Texas, RG 393, National Archives.
12. Pope to Whipple, January 9, 1880, Victoria Papers.
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reaches of southern New Mexico. To his evident chagrin, the overworked soldiers shared none of the honors for finally driving the Apache
raiders out of the territory. Rather, on May 24, Henry K. Parker and
a company of Indian scouts jumped Victorio near the head of the
Palomas River. Parker reported killing thirty men, women, and children
and capturing seventy-four head of cattle. Perhaps wounded, and his
band severely crippled, Victorio limped back to the safety of Mexico. 13
In the aftermath of the abortive New Mexico operation, the army
high command nearly committed a fatal blunder. In response to repeated requests from Colonel Hatch, Lieutenant General Philip H.
Sheridan, commanding the Division of the Missouri at Chicago, in late
May dispatched three companies of the Tenth Cavalry from Fort Sill
to West Texas and ordered Grierson to proceed to Fort Stanton, New
Mexico, where he would hold the country east of the Rio Grande while
Hatch operated against Victorio in the west. Confusion resulted for
several weeks as Ord insisted that while detached to the Department
of the Missouri, Grierson remain subject only to orders emanating from
headquarters, Department of Texas. Grierson strongly protested the
move to New Mexico, arguing persuasively that it would lay West Texas
open to devastation should Victorio cross the Rio Grande east of El
Paso. Fortunately Sheridan, who harbored a low opinion of Grierson,
relented and rescinded the order. Grierson immediately deployed his
troops at strategic waterholes to counter Victorio's next move. 14
Meanwhile, the administration in Washington adopted a somewhat conciliatory attitude toward Mexico, while continuing to press
for permission for United States troops to pursue Victorio onto Mexican
soil. Despite Ord's earlier warnings the new Secretary of War, Alexander Ramsey, on February 24, 1880, revoked the order of June 1, 1877,
which allowed army contingents to cross the border in hot pursuit. In
relaying the information to the Mexican consul in Washington, Secretary of State William Evarts expressed the satisfaction of President
Hayes that "the efforts of the Mexican military in guarding the frontier
13. Reports of Hatch's campaign and the disarming of the Mescaleros are in Annual
Report of the s.ecretary of War, 1880 (4 vols., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1880), 1, 93-104, 154-58. The activities of Gatewood's scouts are recounted in Thomas
Cruse, Apache Days and After (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1941), 53-81. See also,
Thrapp, Victoria, 268-74.
14. Telegrams, Vincent to District Commander, Concho, May 24, 28, 1880; Ord to
Adjutant General, Chicago, June 2, 3, 1880; Ord to District Commander, Concho, June
28, 1880, all in Letters Sent, Department of Texas; Grierson to Assistant Adjutant General,
San Antonio, Texas, June 4, 1880, Telegrams Sent, District of the Pecos, RG 393, National
Archives.
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make the order no longer necessary" and hoped that "no future occurances on the border" would disturb cordial relations between the
two countries. The Mexican representative responded that this action
had dispelled the "only shadow that darkened the northern horizon
of our republic," and accepted it as proof of the Hayes Administration's
desire to establish cordial relations. IS
That the mutual cordiality was more apparent than real became
quickly evident when Victorio exited New Mexico and took refuge in
Mexico for the second time. On June 21, the new American consul, P.
H. Morgan, presented to Mexico's foreign minister, Miguel Ruelas, a
formal request for permission for American troops to cross into Mexico.
Morgan assured Ruelas that upon capture of Victorio's band American
soldiers would immediately withdraw to their own soil and during
their stay would not interfere with the rights of Mexican citizens. "Let
us act now," he pleaded, "and negotiate hereafter."16
Still resentful of Hayes's tardiness in according recognition to his
government and careful not to arouse the wrath of the Mexican electorate on the eve of a presidential election by allowing American troops
on Mexican soil, Diaz stalled. Congress, Ruelas informed Morgan, had
authorized the Mexican president to negotiate a convention providing
for reciprocal crossings by both Mexican and U.S. forces. This Diaz
was prepared to do. He could not, however, allow United States military units unilaterally to cross the border in pursuit of Indians. The
refusal, Ruelas carefully explained, was "not for want of will, but for
the want of legal authority." In the meantime, Mexico's War Minister
had instructed army units nearest the point where the Indians had
crossed into Mexico to undertake pursuit on Mexican soil, "placing
themselves in accord, if this should be possible, with the forces of the
United States, in order to make their mutual cooperation more efficacious."l?
Diplomatic relations grew heated when President Hayes expressed
regret at Diaz's refusal to permit American border crossings and directed Morgan to inform the Mexican government that the United
States would not be held responsible for depredations committed by
Victorio in Mexico, but that it would hold Mexico culpable for damages
should the Indians return to American soil. 18 Terminally ill, Ruelas rose
15. The pertinent correspondence is in Foreign Relations, 1880, 735-36, 744, 781-83.
16. P. H. Morgan to Miguel Ruelas, June 21, 1880, enclosed to Morgan to Evarts,
June 29, 1880, ibid., 759.
17. Ruelas to Morgan, June 23, 1880, enclosed in ibid., 760-61.
18. Evarts to Morgan, July 23, 1880, enclosed in Morgan to Evarts, July 13, 1880,
ibid., 756-57 and 762, respectively.
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from his sickbed to outline his government's position. Mexican refusal
to allow American troops in Mexico could not be considered granting
asylum to Indians, as those very Indians then committed murders and
robberies on Mexican citizens. Nor could Mexico reasonably be held
responsible for future depredations Victorio's warriors might commit
in the United States. Suppressing Indian raids was equally in the best
interests of both countries, and the Mexican government was prepared
to negotiate for reciprocal border crossings to accomplish that end. In
the meantime, the Diaz administration was doing everything in its
power to capture Victorio's band. As examples of Mexico's earnestness,
Ruelas pointed to General Trevino's lackluster campaign the previous
winter and to Colonel Adolfo Valle's expedition just getting under way
in Chihuahua. 19
Attention swiftly shifted back to the military as at 9 a.m. on July
25 Colonel Valle telegraphed Colonel Grierson from the Sierra Borracho, via Fort Quitman, Texas, that Indians had attacked his pickets
in the Sierra Pino, killing one soldier, wounding three others, and
running off ten horses. Valle was marching north and requested that
Grierson cover the passes along the Rio Grande. 20
A violent storm disrupted telegraph communications between United
States and Mexican forces shortly after Grierson received Valle's communication. To his dismay, a ragged and starving army encamped
opposite Fort Quitman on July 29. Valle informed his American counterpart that he was authorized to cross into the United States in pursuit
of Victorio. But the swollen river and the weakened condition of his
command, not having eaten in three days, precluded further operations, even if Grierson had allowed the crossing. Instead, the American
commander issued 3,000 pounds of flour and 1,130 pounds of grain to
the destitute Mexicans and rushed east to intercept Victorio's warriors
in the vicinity of Eagle Springs. 21
19. Ruelas to Morgan, July 23, 1880, enclosed in Morgan to Evarts, July 24, 1880,
ibid., 764-65. Ruelas died eight weeks later, on September 22. John Hay to Morgan,
October 20, 1880, ibid., 780.
20. Telegram, Adolfo F. Valle to Grierson, July 25, 1880, Letters Received, District

of the Pecos, RG 393, National Archives.
21. Telegram, Grierson to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Texas, July
20, 29, 1880, Telegrams Sent, District of the Pecos, RG 393; Receipt for supplies received
by Valle, July 29, 1880, Letters Received, District of the Pecos, RG 393. Grierson to
Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Texas, September 20, 1880, in Annual Report
of the Secretary of War, 1880, I, 159. Robert Grierson, the colonel's son, describes a dinner
hosted by the American officers for their Mexican counterparts. See Robert K. Grierson,
"Journal Kept in the Victorio Campaign in 1880," 11-13, typescript, copy in author's
files.
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Davis National Historic Site, National Park Service.
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Edward Hatch. Courtesy Fort Davis
National Historic Site, National Park
Service.

Grierson's troop dispositions.guarding precious waterholes in arid
and barren West Texas quickly proved their worth. Unlike Hatch, who
wasted manpower and horseflesh in chasing an elusive foe, Grierson
was able to predict Victorio's movements and block his path. On July
30, the colonel, along with Lieutenant William H. Beck, six troopers of
the Tenth Cavalry, and his teenage son who was on vacation from
school, held the waterhole at Tenaja de las Palmas west of Eagle Springs
until help arrived and drove the Indians back across the Rio Grande.
Expecting to trap the fleeing Apaches between his own troops and
those of Colonel Valle, Grierson sent frantic messages to the Mexican
commander to block Victoria's passage south of the river. To his consternation, Valle had marched off in the opposite direction toward £1
Paso to refit and reprovision his command. 22
22. Telegrams, Grierson to Commanding Officer Mexican Troops opposite Quitman,
July 31, 1880; William H. Beck to Palmer, telegraph operator, Quitman, July 31, 1880,
Telegrams Sent, District of the Pecos; Valle to Grierson, August 4, 1880, Letters Received,
District of the Pecos, RG 393. Grierson to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of
Texas, September 20, 1880, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1880, I, 160. The most
comprehensive study of Grierson's engagement is Douglas C. McChristian, "Grierson's
Fight at Tenaja de las Palmas: An Episode in the Victoria [sic] Campaign," Red River Valley
Historical Review, 7 (Winter 1952), 45-63.
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Within days Victorio reappeared north of the Rio Grande and
commenced a headlong dash toward New Mexico. In a ride reminiscent
of his Civil War cavalry days, the hero of Grierson's Raid outdistanced
the Apaches in a sixty-five-mile, twenty-one-hour march to Rattlesnake
Springs, north of Van Horn. Arriving before Victoria, the black troopers
once more drove the astonished Indians back across the Rio Grande,
only to discover that Colonel Valle had withdrawn his troops entirely
from the frontier to put down a revolution in Chihuahua. "If the Mexican troops had been ready and in condition to attack the Indians when
they were forced across the Rio Grande," Grierson lamented, "or if I
had had authority to pursue them into Mexico ... there is little doubt
that Victorio and his band would have been captured and destroyed."
Like most military men along the border, he concluded that the Mexican
government had failed to take "decisive measures" to expel the Apaches
from Mexican soil, and he remained pessimistic that the Diaz government would ever allow American troop crossings because of the uproar
it would create among the Mexican people. "In any event," he concluded, "no effective co-operation need be expected, on account of the
defective material and organization of the Mexican troops."The colonel
contented himself with holding the waterholes in his sprawling district
and dispatched civilian interpreter Charles Berger and a handful of
Pueblo Indian scouts to trail Victorio into Mexico. 23
Despite Grierson's pessimistic appraisal, the Hayes Administration stepped up diplomatic efforts to pry permission for troop crossings
out of Diaz. On September 15, Acting Secretary of State William Hunter
instructed Consul Morgan once again to press upon Mexico the urgent
necessity of allowing United States soldiers to operate south of the
border or to shoulder responsibility for future acts of violence by Victorio's warriors. 24 The following day, President Diaz in his address to
the opening of Congress informed the assembled delegates that Mexican regulars had driven the Indians north of the Rio Grande and were
operating in conjunction with American forces, with the distinct understanding that neither side would violate the territory of the other.
Evidently Grierson's successful strategy in West Texas appealed to the
Mexican chief executive, as he announced plans to set up military
23. Grierson to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Texas, September 20,
1880, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1880, 161-62. Grierson's campaign, the only
one he ever conducted against hostile Indians, is described in Leckie, Buffalo Soldiers,
223-29. Berger reported his scout in Mexico to William H. Beck, August 23, 1880, Letters
Received, District of the Pecos, RG 393.
24. Hunter to Morgan, September 15, 1880, Foreign Relations, 1880, 768.
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colonies at waterholes in northern Mexico to block further Apache
incursions. 25 Approached by Morgan several days later, Diaz continued
to hold out for a treaty allowing reciprocal border crossings. 26
While diplomatic negotiations stalemated, the military seized the
initiative. In late August, Luis Terrazas, governor of Chihuahua, ordered his cousin Colonel Joaquin Terrazas and Colonel Valle into the
field to hunt down and destroy Victorio's raiders. Competent, energetic, and ambitious, Colonel Terrazas embraced the assignment with
vigor and determination. 27
In New Mexico, meanwhile, Colonel George P. Buell of the Fifteenth Infantry had for some time been restless to follow the Apache
marauders into Mexico. His opportunity arrived when Captain Henry
Brinkerhoff, commanding at Fort Bliss, Texas, forwarded to Colonel
Hatch a copy of instructions, in Spanish, from the Mexican war minister
to Colonel Valle. Translated into English, the letter suggested to Hatch
that the Mexicangovernment had approved cooperation between United
States and Mexican forces, without regard to national boundaries. Eager to seize the initiative, the New Mexico commander recommended
to General Pope that joint operations be undertaken. Pope concurred
and on September 10 ordered Buell and requested Colonel Eugene Carr
from Arizona to converge in Mexico and coordinate their movements
with those of Colonel Terrazas, who was marching north toward Victorio's reported encampment in the vicinity of Laguna de Guzman. 28
Caught between Mexican forces moving north, Carr's meandering
Arizona column, and Buell's command (which included Lieutenant
Baylor's volunteers and Berger's Pueblo scouts) driving south and east,
Victorio withdrew into the fortified recesses of the Candelaria Mountains. At the same time, however, authorities on both sides of the Rio
Grande were questioning Buell's presence in Mexico. Urged by the
impetuous colonel to join the pursuit in Chihuahua, Colonel Grierson
responded, "Latest information I have received from Department
Headquarters inform me that there is no authority for United States
troops to cross into Mexico.... [U]ntil I have proper authority to cross
25. Diaz's speech is enclosed in Morgan to Evarts, September 16, 1880, ibid., 76874.

26. Morgan to Evarts, September 21, 1880, ibid., 774-76.
27. For a description and evaluation of Joaquin Terrazas, see Thrapp, Victoria, 293.
28. Valle to H. R. Brinkerhoff, August 9, 1880, enclosed in Edward Hatch to Headquarters, Department of the Missouri, August 18, 1880; telegram, George P. Buell to
Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, October 15, 1880, both in
Victorio Papers. A copy of Buell's dispatch appeared in the New York Times, October 28,
1880.
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my troops into Mexico, will certainly not do so, and regret I cannot
comply with your request. "29
The State Department also was puzzled by Buell's incursion across
the border. Correspondence moved slowly through bureaucratic channels and it was September 20 before the Secretary of State was able to
examine the Mexican war minister's letter of August 9 to Colonel Valle
and relay his opinion, through the Secretary of War, to General Sheridan. The original translation, the secretary reported, was flawed. Instead of authorizing United States troops to cross the international
boundary, the communication only urged cooperation and continued
communication between American and Mexican units on the frontier.
The Dfaz government had, in fact, reiterated its insistence that military
operations be conducted with scrupulous observance of territorial limits. Buell's presence in Mexico clearly violated international law, and
on October 9 or 10, General Pope cryptically telegraphed the colonel
to return "as soon as he can do so, without compromising Terrassas."3o
By the time he received Pope's order, Buell was already moving
north. It is unlikely that without the Americans' help Terrazas would
have cornered Victorio, and he was openly grateful for their assistance.
Nevertheless, he was also aware of the public outcry and the political
repercussions that would ensue should the American troops participate
in the capture of the Apaches on Mexican soil. Consequently, on the
night of October 9, he notified Colonel Buell that the further advance
of United States forces into Mexico was objectionable. Although disappointed at being robbed of the kill, Buell and Carr, along with Baylor's eclectic force, promptly broke off their pursuit. Within a week,
Terrazas brought down the final curtain on the campaign when he
attacked and killed Victorio in the Tres Castillos Mountains. 3!
Although the Victorio campaign ended without a resolution of the
29. Grierson to Buell, October 6,1880, Letters Sent, District of the Pecos, Letterbook,
RG 393. Buell's report is in Martin L. Crimmins, "Colonel Buell's Expedition
into Mexico in 1880," New Mexico Historical Review, 10 (April 1935), 133-42. Eugene Carr's
operations are discussed in James T. King, War Eagle: A Life of General Eugene A. Carr
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), 190-95; and Cruse, Apache Days and After,
81-87. Baylor's report to John B. Jones, October 28, 1880, is in Texas Adjutant General's
Office Transcripts, 1879-1880, Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas, Austin.
30. Hunter to Ramsey, September 15, 1880, Victorio Papers. Pope's undated order
is quoted in telegram, Nicholas Nolan to Assistant Adjutant General, San Antonio, Texas,
October 10, 1880, Telegrams Sent, District of the Pecos, RG 393.
31. Buell to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, October 15,
1880, Victorio Papers. Baylor to Jones, October 28, 1880, Texas Adjutant General's Office
Transcripts, Barker Texas History Center. Victorio's last battle is described in Thrapp,
Victoria, 293-314.
196~98,
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United States-Mexican border crossings, it nonetheless represented an
important episode in diplomatic and military relations between the
two nations. By rescinding the objectionable order of June 1, 1877, and
adopting a somewhat less high-handed policy toward Mexico, the Hayes
Administration had removed major stumbling blocks to calmer relations along the border. Poor communications and political upheaval
in Chihuahua made military cooperation difficult. Never'theless, it
brought American and Mexican officers into close contact-often for
the first time-and fostered a measure of mutual understanding and
respect. Few any longer doubted Diaz's sincerity when he pmmised
to resolve the Indian pmblem on his country's northern fmntier. Finally, although the question of border crossings remained unresolved,
the two governments had laid the gmundwork for a future resolution
of the problem. On July 29, 1883, new administrations in Washington
and Mexico City, unburdened by the mutual mistrust and political
tensions of the Diaz and Hayes presidencies, signed an agreement for
recipmcal crossings of troops over the border in pursuit of hostile
Indians.

